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LAW AND SOCIETY. Edited by A.E. WILKERSON. Philadelphia,
Pa.: Temple University Press, 1973. Pp. 313. $10.00.
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. By J. GOLD-
STEIN, A. FIiuD, AND A.J. SOLNIT. New York, N.Y.: The Free
Press, 1973. Pp. 170. $7.95.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE.
By SANFORD J. Fox. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1972.
Pp. 1012. $16.50.
W. ANTHONY FITcH*
The appearance of The Rights of Children, Beyond the Best Interests
of the Child, and Modern Juvenile Justice within the past two years
reflects the growing complexity of the laws pertaining to children as
well as the increasing attention being afforded this area of the law by
a growing number of organizations providing legal and other types of
assistance.' This intensive activity, part of the larger civil rights "ex-
*A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard University; M.A., State University of
New York, Albany. Adjunct Professor of Law and Director, Metropolitan Criminal
Justice Center, The College of William and Mary.
1. Organizations currently concentrating on problems in this area include the Na-
tional Juvenile Law Center and the Youth Law Center (both national research and
technical assistance, or "back-up," centers of the Legal Services Program), the Juvenile
Justice Standards Project of the Institute of, Judicial Administration, the recently
established Juvenile Law Center at the University of Pittsburgh funded by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Mental Health Law Project of the Center
for Law and Social Policy (a public interest law firm, located in Washington, D.C.),
and the legal aid and public defender services in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and New
York.
For examples of issues of. current concern in this area, see Wilson v. Thompson, 7
CL.AIUNGHousE Rzv. 621 (S.D.W. Va., filed Dec. 13, 1973) (No. 73-303 CH) (confine-
ment of juveniles in county jail without a prior hearing); Sheehan v. Scott, 7
CLEAR NGHOUSE Rrv. 559 (N.D. Ill., filed Nov. 20, 1973) (No. 73-C-2950) (allegation
of unconstitutionality of truancy provision of state juvenile code); Morales v. Turman,
364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (interim emergency order, discussed note 109
infra); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Nelson v.
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plosion" in the state and especially the federal courts,2 probably ac-
counts in large part for the failure of these three books, notwithstanding
their varied subject matter, to provide wholly inclusive and up-to-date
analysis of this rapidly developing field. Nevertheless, they are, as a
group, indispensable to any lawyer seriously concerned about adequately
performing his responsibilities as trial counsel, legislator, agency admin-
istrator, or judge in matters affecting children.
The problem of timeliness is particularly serious in the collection of
essays edited by Albert E. Wilkerson, a member of the faculty of the
School of Social Administration at Temple University. In The Rights
of Children, only six of the 23 pieces-the introduction, the epilogue,
and four articles-originally appeared in the 1970's. Such selections as
the 1959 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child;3 a 1968
Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972, supp. opinion 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352
(7th Cir. 1974) (discussed note 109 infra); Breed v. R.W., 7 CLEARING-
HOUSE REv. 349 (Cal. Ct. App, filed Aug. 31, 1973) (No. 2d Crim. 24029) (order
releasing juvenile from training school on ground that school had abused its discretion in
not releasing the child); L.L. v. Linn, 7 CLEAINGHOUSE REv. 560 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Nov. 13, 1973) (No. 307) (challenge to the authority of a juvenile court to commit
child to mental hospital without full hearing, including trial by jury); In re E.M.B,
13 CuM. L. REPt. 2328 (D.C. Super. Ct., June 14, 1973) (No. J. 1365-73); In re P.J.,
7 CX.EARNGHO sE REv. 108 (D.C. Super. Ct., Mar. 21, 1973) (held on constitutional
grounds that a juvenile cannot be denied an abortion solely because of her age or
her parents' objection); In re Savoy, Nos. 70-4808 and 70-4714 (Juv. Ct. of D.C., Oct.
13, 1970) (discussed note 105 infra); Perrone v. Layman, 7 C.EARINGHOUSE REv. 559
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Juv. Div., Oct. 13, 1973) (order by juvenile court re-
stricting grounds for preadjudication detention of juveniles and limiting such detention
to ten days); In re Owens, No. 70 J 21520 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, Juv. Div., July
9, 1971) (order by juvenile court to Illinois training school to restrict the use of
behavior control devices and to establish disciplinary procedures, and appointing a
guardian ad litem for all children committed by the court to the institution); 0. H. v.
French, 504 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1973) (involving the constitutional and statutory validity
of the transfer of incarcerated juveniles to prisons for adult offenders); In re Ellery
C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 588, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973). See also Juvenile Justice
Standards Project, Juvenile Law Litigation Directory (Institute for Judicial Admin-
istration, N.Y.U. School of Law, June 1973); National Juvenile Law Center, Selected
Bibliography for Right to Treatment (St. Louis Univ. School of Law, 1973); U.S. Dep't
of Justice, LEAA Newsletter, November 1973, at 23; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1973, § 1, at
27, col. 1; Clark, Troubled Children: The Quest for Help, NEwswE u, April 8, 1974, at
52.
2. H. FRENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICrON: A GENERAL Vmv 15-27 (1973). Judge Friendly
cites a 1346 percent increase in "civil rights actions" filed annually in the United States
district courts between 1961 and 1970.
3. United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, in THE RIGHTS OF CmLuRN:
EmGrtErr CONcEPTS IN LAW AND Sociry 3 (A.E. Wilkerson ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Wilkerson].
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article4 by a social work academician referring to Miranda v.
Arizona as a case dealing with "the field of adult corrections" 6 and
spealdng of the continuing "trend of the Court ... toward expanding
rather than contracting the rights of the accused"; 7 and a 1969 law
review article which, although well written, argues the practical, moral,
and constitutional case against abortion s are not very enlightening or
helpful to the involved lawyer, planner, administrator, or scholar in
1974.
Other selections are equally questionable. For example, a student note
on a 1970 Hawaii case involving the issue whether a parent can be
joined as a joint tortfeasor in an action brought by the child 9 and a
1967 student comment which competently summarizes the decision in
In re Gault' without providing much additional analysis" fail to meet
the editor's own criterion of selecting "pieces which take the definition
or implementation of children's rights a step further, or which iden-
tify problems and issues that impede movements in this direction." 12
Wilkerson quite properly points out that "[h]uman rights and legal
rights.., can be relatively useless unless they are supported by a net-
work of human services that reflect a major social policy commitment
to health and welfare." 13 This cursory acknowledgement of harder
questions is expanded upon by Justine Wise Polier, Judge of the Family
Court of the State of New York.14 In contrast to Wilkerson's easy as-
sumption that "[tihe protective service agencies have done a com-
mendable job during the past century" 15 and his unhelpful, vague
statement that "[o]ne has to concede that the present system of child
4. Coughlin, The Rights of Children, in Wilkerson at 7.
5. 348 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Coughlin, supra note 4, in Wilkerson at 11.
7. Id.
8. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, in
WVilkerson at 47. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973), the Court held most provisions of Texas and Georgia qtatutes regulating
abortion unconstitutional and announced specific criteria with which abortion legisla-
tion must comply.
9. Andell, A Minor Has an Absolute Right to Sue His Parents for a Negligent Tort,
in Wilkerson at 98.
10. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11. Stansby, In Re Gault: Children are People, in Wilkerson at 285.
12. Wilkerson at ix.
13. Id. at vii.
14. Poller, Introduction, in Vilkerson at xii.
15. Wilkerson at xi.
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protection runs close to violating due process of law for the parent or
guardian," 16 Judge Polier more forthrightly discerns in the collected
essays the degree to which those concerned with the rights of children
"are imprisoned within a system which denies access to the very goals
they seek." 17 Frankly acknowledging the indifference of American
society toward children's rights, Judge Poller continues:
While our rhetoric reflects the American mythology about chil-
dren as our most precious resource, our actions conform to a
pathology which allows blindness to deprivations that brand
children with the stigmata of feeling neither wanted nor needed.
It is this pathological blindness that alienates and destroys the ca-
pacity in children for caring for others or having hope for them-
selves.' 8
Citing such scandals as the use of adult jails for the preadjudication
incarceration of juveniles and the lack of appropriate treatment serv-
ices,19 Judge Polier stresses the "urgent need to confront false promises,
to protect individual rights, and at the same time, to exert unremitting
efforts to secure services and facilities without which legal rights can
mean little" 20 and demands that we face up to the question of "why
American society has been least generous toward its children and why
the judicial, as well as the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment, have been so reluctant and so tardy in protecting the constitu-
tional rights of children." 21
A number of the remaining essays in the Wilkerson collection respond
to this question in terms of more specific issues and provide some thought-
ful suggestions concerning their resolution. Two articles deal usefully
with the various roles or responsibilities which are, or at least should be,
assumed by those who purport to speak for the child 22 and 'with "The
16. id.
17. Polier, supra note 14, in Wilkerson at xiii.
18. id. at xiv.
19. Id. at xvi. See also JomH HowARD Ass'N, CoMPREHENsrvE LONG RANGE MASM R
PLAN FOR JUVENILE AND YOUTHFUL OFFENDER JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN THE COAMON-WEALTH
OF VIRGINIA 54, 58-98 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MASTER PLAN ]. This study indicates
that these problems persist throughout Virginia.
20. Polier, supra note 14, in Wilkerson at xix.
21. Id. at xvi.
22. Keith-Lucas, "Speaking for the Child": A Role-Analysis and Some Cautions,
in Wilkerson at 218.
[ ol. 15:971
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Role of the Social Worker in Family Court Decision-Making." 2 In
the first essay, Alan Keith-Lucas reminds lawyers, social workers, and
others that speaking for the child's desires, rights, and needs (as one or
more persons may perceive them) all involve very differing assump-
tions, responsibilities, and modes of preparation and presentation. 24 Even
more importantly, Wilkerson and 0. Duane Kroeker convincingly de-
molish the myths that social workers merely report "objective social
data" 25 and "that the social worker and lawyer need to learn how to
collaborate better and come to a consensus more readily around mutual
cases." 26 They emphasize, rather, that value judgments are inherent in
the social report and that it inevitably contains biases arising from the
practices involved in social work and child welfare, from the social
worker's own values,27 and from the presumption, unvalidated by re-
search, for placement of children of separated parents with the mother.28
The authors also note that the social work profession has long been
guilty of "attempting to incorporate psychoanalytic knowledge, but
knowing it only cursorily and without possessing appropriate method-
ology to make it appropriate and consistently meaningful." 29 These are
caveats which all lawyers, but especially the young attorneys who in
most jurisdictions appear in such a large portion of the cases in juvenile
and domestic relations courts, should bear constantly in mind. Defer-
ence to social workers is even less appropriate and responsible than the
failure to cross-examine diligently other properly qualified expert wit-
nesses representing more fully developed disciplines.
The troubling problem of and legislative response toward child abuse
are competently analyzed in a 1965 article'0 by Robert E. Shepherd, an
assistant attorney general of Virginia. Although dated in some respects,
the article does identify and concisely review the conflicting argu-
ments on the basic questions which must be resolved in the drafting of
child abuse reporting legislation and would seem to merit reading by
the Virginia General Assembly, which was unable at its 1974 session
23. Wilkerson & Kroeker, The Role of the Social Worker in Family Court Decision-
Making, in Wilkerson at 274.
24. Keith-Lucas, supra note 22.
25. Wilkerson & Kroeker, supra note 23, in Wilkerson at 283.
26. Id. at 277.
27. Id. at 282.
28. Id. at 279.
29. Id. at 278.
30. Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, in Wilkerson at 174.
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to reach any resolution whatsoever.3' The common legislative response
to child abuse is more forcefully attacked by Lois Forer, Judge of the
Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia, who observes: "To date legal
consideration of the problems of the abused child has been unimaginative
and sterile. Reporting statutes are the only remedy seriously consid-
ered. . . . The obvious remedies of appointment of a guardian and
counsel for the child to bring suit against those who have abused him are
overlooked." 82
Other articles deal with such more or less esoteric topics as the
"Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemination"; 3 the con-
stitutionality after Shapiro v. Thompson3 4 of "fiscal clearing" regula-
tions or statutes35 under which a state welfare agency may refuse to
accept custody of a child unless the transferring state agrees to con-
tinue to provide support;36 the implications37 of Levy v. Louisi-
ana8 and Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co.;39
and the possible entitlement of foster children to various benefits avail-
able to their foster parents pursuant to various federal statutes.4
A short, provocative article by Judge Lindsay G. Arthur of Min-
nesota raises numerous questions about the actual degree, even after
Gault, to which various constitutional guarantees do and should apply to
juveniles in delinquency proceedings. 41 Such issues as the competency
of counsel, the scope of fourth and fifth amendment protection, the law
31. See Richmond Times-Dispatch, March 10, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 4.
32. Forer, Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuun, in Wilkerson at 24, 33 n.15.
33. Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemination, in Wilkerson at
72.
34. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional one-year residency requirements
for receipt of welfare assistance).
35. An example is the Uniform Transfer of Dependents Act, which had been
adopted by Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-99 (Repl. Vol. 1968), but was repealed by
c. 721, Acts of. the Virginia General Assembly, 1970.
36. Cox, Indigent Children and Fiscal Clearing, in Wilkerson at 106.
37. Krause, The Bastard Finds His Father, in Wilkerson at 138.
38. 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional the Louisiana wrongful death
statute, which had been construed by the state courts to preclude recovery by
illegitimate children).
39. 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (holding unconstitutional the Louisiana wrongful death
statute which had been construed by the state courts to preclude recovery by the
mother of an illegitimate child).
40. Du Fresne, The Rights of Foster Children to Financial Benefits of Foster Parents
Under Federal Statutes, in Wilkerson at 150.
41. Arthur, Should Children Be as Equal as People?, in Wilkerson at 118.
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of arrest and detention, the availability of bail, the protection against
being twice placed in jeopardy, the utilization of punishment, and the
waiver of various constitutional or statutory rights all merit judicial and
legislative examination in Virginia.42 At a more general level, Judge
Arthur's article, like that by Judge Forer, shatters the delusion held
by many that "the Gault case has had a startling impact on the juvenile
court" 43 and underscores that, even if Gault has significantly changed
those few areas of the juvenile process which it addresses (a proposition
that can be seriously questioned), it leaves many more questions unre-
solved.
A number of articles deal with various procedural and substantive
issues involved in custody questions arising out of neglect, divorce, fos-
ter placement, and adoption proceedings. Several argue for the seeming-
ly undeniable proposition that children in these cases should be repre-
sented by court-appointed counsel and should have full party status.44
Others raise such issues or suggest such measures as the designation of
percentages of income for child support 4 5 governmental withholding
of child support payments;46 greater detail in child support decrees
regarding insurance, higher education, and special education;47 and
provisions in divorce decrees for the "joint custody of the child, the
appointment of a confidential adult ally for the child and a committee
chosen by the parents to decide questions on which the parents are
unable to agree." 48
Even more importantly, these same articles call into question in various
ways the traditional "best interests of the child" standard. The vague-
ness of this standard and its consequent lack of guidance are pointed
42. "The Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations Code (Title 16.1, Ch. 8) should
receive major revision. . . . The present Code is overly complex, vague in meaning,
conflicting and in a number of respects, outdated." MASTER PrAN, supra note 19, at 45.
See also Fitch, The Need for Revision of Virginia's Juvenile Court Statute, Tim
COLONAL LANWER, Vinter 1973, at 4 (published by the Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, The College of William and Mary).
43. E.g., Coughlin, supra note 4, in Wilkerson at 21.
44. Coyne, Who Will Speak for the Child?, in Wilkerson at 193, 208-11; Hansen,
Guardians Ad Litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the Child's Interests,
in IVilkerson at 239, 240. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173 (f) (Cum. Supp. 1973).




48. Kubic, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal
instrument, in Wilkerson at 212, 214.
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out dramatically; 9 the conflict, not yet resolved in Virginia,"0 between
the "best interests" standard and the presumption for parental rights is
demonstrated; and the uncertain impact of the "best interests" standard
on such factors as the age of the child, the preference of the child,
community values or standards, and the religious preference of the
various parties is underscored.5'
These and other concerns are presented most tellingly and analyzed
most carefully in the outstanding article by Sanford Katz of the Boston
College Law School.5 2 In driving toward his conclusions and recom-
mendations regarding the "best interests of the child" standard in
child custody cases, Katz uses as his vehicle In re Jewish Child Care As-
sociation,53 involving a story which, he argues, "is similar to that of
many other children who are similarly involved in the struggle of foster
parents to adopt children over the objections of placement agencies." 14
After convincingly demonstrating through his analysis of the factual
situation that the primary disqualification of the foster parents as po-
tential adoptive parents was that they loved the child at issue too
much,55 Katz reaches two basic conclusions. First, he observes:
To the majority of the [New York] Court of Appeals, the fact
that the Sanders were Laura's foster, rather than natural or future
adoptive, parents was crucial. The court perceived foster parent-
hood as something less than full parenthood. . . . In essence,
what the majority took as conclusive in the case, namely the
"vital fact. . . that Mr. and Mrs. Sanders are not, and presumably
will never be, Laura's parents by adoption," was the very issue the
court was to decide.
It seems safe to say that when courts invoke the parental
rights doctrine to award custody to the natural parents, they are
49. Levine, Child Custody: Iova Corn and the Avant Garde, in Wilkerson at 232;
Coyne, supra note 44.
50. Cf. Forbes v. Hanley, 205 Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963); Judd v. Van Horn,
195 Va. 988, 81 S.E.2d 432 (1954).
51. Coyne, supra note 44, in Wilkerson at 195-97, 199-207.
52. Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Application
of "The Best Interests of the Child" Doctrine, in Wilkerson at 244. This article is also
incorporated into the important work, KATz, WHEN PARENTs FAIL: THE LAW's
RESPONSE To FAmmy BREAKDOWN (1971).
53. 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959).
54. Katz, supra note 52, in Wilkerson at 245.
55. Id. at 249-50.
Vol. 15:971
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merely articulating an archaic notion, based upon a preference for
the continuity of blood ties or the preservation of kinship loyalty,
in order to justify a decision. It is a significant aspect of Child
Care that the majority was more concerned with the symbol of
natural family loyalty than its fact. As indicated previously,
Laura's natural mother had seen the child twice in four years, and
Laura's loyalty to her would seem, at best, to be more imaginary
than real.56
Second, and even more fundamentally, the Child Care decision, in
Katz's view, reflects the prostitution of the court's decisionmaking
jurisdiction to an administrative agency and the almost inevitable reso-
lution of custody issues in favor of established institutions and against
the position of an individual family:
The integrity of the law, as manifested in the child-placement
contract and in the administrative decisions of a private agency,
had been challenged. In order to maintain authority, these ad-
ministrative policies had to be affirmed and the child-placement
contract enforced: "[T] he program of agencies such as Child
Care . . . may not be subverted by foster parents who breach
their trust."
The majority in Child Care was again concerned with symbols.
Judge Conway seemed compelled to preserve the sanctity of legal
doctrines and, indirectly, the reputation of a community institu-
tion. The Sanders had been a threat both to the integrity and the
stability of the placement contract and to the prestige of the
Agency....
Child custody proceedings, more than other litigation, may be
merely a cover for the real conflicts: a power struggle between
individuals, institutions, or individuals and institutions, which cul-
minates in a decision that indicates a preference for certain social
values over others .... The important question before the court
was not necessarily who should be awarded custody of Laura, al-
though this inevitably was resolved, but whose decision-making
power was to be recognized, the welfare agency's or the foster
parents'. In Child Care, the Agency prevailed, and the decison
therefore may be described as one which furthered the best in-
terests of the Agency.5 7
56. Id. at 250-52 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 252-53.
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Having demonstrated that Child Care and similar cases" allow a
court "to camouflage its own values, provincial community values, or
the interests of dominant local institutions," 19 Katz, unlike the other
authors in the Wilkerson collection, confronts and proceeds to analyze
at some length the "best interests of the child" standard in order both
to flesh out and to circumscribe that doctrine. With some argument
on each point, he suggests that the best interests of the child can be and
should only be determined on the basis of four elements: "(1) order,
integrity and family loyalty; (2) financial security; (3) health and ed-
ucation; (4) morality and respect." 10 These "minimum goals of parent-
hood," 61 together with such procedures as "widen[ing] the scope of
inquiry beyond the immediate claimants" and "requir[ing] concrete
plans for a child rather than be [ing] forced into deciding a custody case
on the basis of agency assumptions," 62 should, Katz suggests, at least
prevent such travesties as have occurred in Child Care,, and similar
cases.14
In Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, Goldstein, a lawyer, and
Freud and Solnit, two psychoanalysts, take the next logical step, arguing
for the abolition of the "best interests of the child" standard. Certain
to become a classic, this rarest of achievements, a truly interdisciplinary
work, is a model of concise, logical, and precise advocacy. All of its
operative terms are defined; the strengths of its analytical tools are
identified and their limitations acknowledged; and its basic set of
underlying values-that the child's needs are paramount and that
state intervention in the child-parent relationship should be kept at a
minimum6S-are forthrightly stated, utilized, and adhered to.
The argument of the book is so important and persuasive that a full
summary is imperative. As their starting point, the authors sketch the
peculiar psychology of children: "Children have their own built-in
time sense . ... [resulting in] an intense sensitivity to the length of
separations.... [and] have no psychological conception of relationship
58. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949
(1966), discussed in Katz, supra note 52, in Wilkerson at 268-70.
59. Katz, supra note 52, in Wilkerson at 270.
60. Id. at 256.
61. Id. at 270.
62. Id. at 271.
63. See notes 53-57 supra & accompanying text.
64. See note 58 supra.




by blood-tie until quite late in their development." 6 On the basis of
these and other special features of children, the authors develop three
highly useful concepts: "the wanted child," 67 "the psychological par-
ent," 63 and "the common-law adoptive parent-child relationship." 69
These concepts, in turn, determine the authors' basic principle: "[C] hil-
dren whose placement becomes the subject of controversy should be
provided with an opportunity to be placed with adults who are or are
likely to become their psychological parents." 71
In accord with this principle, the authors suggest three guidelines re-
flecting their preceding analysis of available analytical tools and of the
state of our current knowledge of childhood. First, "placement decisions
should safeguard the child's need for continuity of relationships." 71
Thus, "each child placement [should] be final and unconditional .... ," 72
There should be no waiting periods following custody decisions in
adoption or divorce proceedings, visitation rights should be decided
not by the court but by the person having custody of the child, and
in foster placements, in contrast to adoptions, the child's ties to the
absent parent should be maintained. 73
The second guideline is that "placement decisions should reflect
the child's, not the adult's, sense of time." 74 Thus, custody decisions
must be made much more quickly than is presently the practice; the
authors are confident that much of the customary delay is due more to
procrastination and to unjustified pretense about our decisionmaking
or predictive abilities than to the requirements of "reasoned judgment." r7
Moreover, custody decisions in divorce cases should be made immediate-
ly, before the divorce action is officially complete, and statutory periods
required for the proof of neglect should be repealed and replaced by a
standard postulating that neglect occurs at the point at which the child
no longer feels wanted.7 6
Third, "child placement decisions must take into account the law's in-
66. Id. at 11-12.
67. Id. at 20-22.
68. Id. at 17-20.
69. Id. at 27-28.
70. Id. at 31.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Id. at 35-39.
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id. at 43.
76. Id. at 46-49.
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capacity to supervise interpersonal relationships and the limits of know-
ledge to make long-range predictions."77 This guideline repeats to
some extent the first standard and is the least helpful or suggestive of
the three; nevertheless, the authors do discuss at somewhat greater
length the types of predictions which we can and cannot presently
make, or justify taking additional time to make78
Incorporating these various value judgments, findings, principles, and
guidelines, the authors suggest a replacement for the "best interests of
the child" standard: "Placement should provide the least detrimental
available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and develop-
ment." 7 The authors hope that this standard will insure speedy de-
cisions by reminding the decisionmakers that the child has already been
inexorably hurt and also that such a standard will avoid the kinds of
situations and decisions reflected in the Child Care litigation. Perhaps
most importantly, the "least detrimental alternative" standard appears
to end any presumption in contested placements for the rights of the
natural parents other than whatever position they can establish on an
equal footing with other claimants.80
In the remainder of their book, after stressing that the child must
always be represented by counsel and have party status,8 ' Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit utilize their approach to rewrite the decision in a case
similar to the Child Care litigation 2 and then reduce their arguments to
a basic "Model Child Placement Statute." 13 The book concludes with
a reexamination of the premise that the child's interests should be
paramount. This, with the possible exception of the chapter explaining
why the "least detrimental alternative" standard is a replacement for,
rather than merely an alternative explanation of, the "best interests of
the child" standard, is probably the least satisfactory segment of the
book. Of course, this is a topic which in many respects is beyond the
realm of rational discussion, and the authors' ex-planation that their
premise does more than any other to "protect future generations of
children by increasing the number of adults-to-be who are likely to be
adequate parents" 84 is probably as convincing as any other.
77. Id. at 49.
78. Id. at 51-52.
79. Id. at 53.
80. Id. at 54.
81. Id. at 65.
82. Id. at 71-95.
83. Id. at 97-101.
84. Id. at 111.
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If the Goldstein-Freud-Solnit book is likely to constitute the basic
work for some years on the child custody/child placement issue, the
scope and comprehensiveness-in most respects-of Modern Juvenile
Justice by Sanford Fox (like Katz, a member of the Boston College Law
School faculty) is likely to make this casebook the standard of com-
parison among teaching materials on the juvenile justice process and an
indispensable reference source in its field.
Fox's casebook is not without some faults. It lacks a complete table
of contents, and this, together with the typically inadequate index
which seems to plague all such books, makes using it unnecessarily time-
consuming until one familiarizes himself with the volume. A piece en-
titled "Delinquency and the Family" provides a convenient yet com-
prehensive review of social science theory concerning delinquency with
which law students should be familiar;85 unfortunately, as so often hap-
pens in casebooks, the remainder of the materials rarely require or help
the law student to draw upon any insights which the various crimin-
ological approaches might provide on legal and administrative issues aris-
ing in the juvenile justice process. Similarly, materials in the first section
of chapter one seem intended, in part, to paint a realistic, even lurid, pic-
ture of day-to-day conditions in many juvenile courts; again, this per-
spective is not consistently maintained throughout the book.
Other criticisms are more idiosyncratic. In a section entitled "To the
Rescue," Fox includes In re Gault,6 In re Winship,"' and McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania,"8 the Supreme Court's most important decisions con-
cerning the juvenile process. This organization does not serve any
readily apparent function; a better structure would have been the place-
ment of these cases in correspondence with the chronological stage of
the adjudicatory process (an approach otherwise generally reflected
in the casebook) which they directly affect. Also, Fox reproduces his
own very important article on "Juvenile Justice Reform: an Historical
Perspective";"9 excerpts from Anthony Platt's The Child-Savers: The In-
85. Rodman and Grams, Delinquency and the Family, in PimrsiENur's ComMissioN
ox LAvW ENFORCEmENT AN ADwMINISTRATION OF JumscE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JJVENII.E
DELINQUENCY AND YoUTH CRasn 188 (1967). Because the incomplete table of contents
fails to list this article, finding it in Appendix B is a matter of luck or persistence. S.
Fox, MODERN JuvENiLE JusncE 935 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fox].
86. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
88. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
89. Fox at 15. This article originally appeared at 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970). Some
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vention of Delinquency," or perhaps from Platt's partial summary of
that book,91 would add considerably to analysis of the fundamental issues
which Fox raises about the scope and purposes of the juvenile process.
As Fox and especially Platt point out, an essential element of the
original movement for a specialized children's court was the perceived
need for reinforcement of the family's influence and control over the
aspects of Fox's historical analysis are challenged by Randleman, Parens Patriae: From
Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205, 215 (1971).
90. A. PLATr, THm CmLD-SAvws: TuE INVENTION oF DELI UENCY (1969).
91. Platt, The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and
Correctional Reform, 381 AxNAIs OF Tim AM. ACADEmY 821 (1968). Platt argues:
The child-saving movement, like most moral crusades, was characterized
by a "rhetoric of legitimization," built on traditional values and imagery....
The discovery of problems posed by "delinquent" youth was greatly in-
fluenced by the role of feminist reformers in the child-saving movement....
Child-saving was a predominantly feminist movement .... Child-saving
was a reputable task for women who were allowed to extend their house-
keeping functions into the community without denying anti-feminist
stereotypes of women's nature and place ....
Child-saving may be understood as a crusade which served symbolic and
status functions for native, middle-class Americans, particularly feminist
groups.... One of the main forces behind the child-saving movement was
a concern for the structure of family life and the proper socialization of
young persons ....
Although the child-savers were responsible for some minor reforms in
jails and reformatories, they were more particularly concerned with extend-
ing governmental control over a whole range of youthful activities that had
previously been handled on an informal basis. The main aim of the child-
savers was to impose sanctions on conduct unbecoming youth and to dis-
qualify youth from enjoying adult privileges....
The child-saving movement was not so much a break with the past as
an affirmation of faith in traditional institutions. Parental authority, educa-
tion at home, and the virtues of rural life were emphasized because they
were in decline at this time .... The child-savers were prohibitionists, in
a general sense, who believed that social progress depended on efficient
law enforcement, strict supervision of children's leisure and recreation, and
the regulation of illicit pleasures. What seemingly began as a movement
to humanize the lives of adolescents soon developed into a program of
moral absolutism ...
It was not by accident that the behavior selected for penalizing by
the child-savers-sexual license, drinking, roaming the streets, begging,
frequenting dance halls and movies, fighting, and being seen in public late
at night-was most directly relevant to the children of lower-class migrant
and immigrant families.
Id. at 822, 826-27, 829.
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child. 2 Today, juvenile-only, or "status," offenses are an important
component of juvenile court caseloads,93 and the juvenile court's con-
tinuing jurisdiction over such situations has been criticized repeatedly. 94
The section in Fox's casebook devoted to cases and other materials deal-
ing with "Offenses Only for Children" is particularly strong; cases
such as In re Mario95 and E.S.G. v. State8 allow for discussion at great
length of the difficulties of definition, the vagueness, the potential for in-
consistent or discriminatory application, and other problems in and
potential for abuse of such juvenile status offenses as "behavior, environ-
ment, condition, association, habits or practices . . . injurious to his
welfare," "habitually disobedient or beyond the control of his parents
or other custodian, or is incorrigible," "a willful and habitual truant," or
"whose condition or situation is alleged to be such that his welfare de-
mands adjudication as to his disposition, control and custody .... " or
92. Fox at 29-31; Platt, supra note 91.
93. Data available from the Norfolk and Virginia Beach, Virginia, juvenile courts,
for example, indicate that up to 25 percent of the courts' caseload consists of such
litigation. The John Howard Association, in its February 1974 report on juvenile
justice systems in Virginia, notes: "Currently, about 30 percent of juvenile court
intake and almost 40 percent of the commitments to the Division of Youth Services
are 'status-offenders', i.e., children involved in behavior that would not be a violation
of, law if committed by an adult:' MAsrER PLAx, supra note 19, at 47.
94. See Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Jv. CT. JtuMxs J. 42 (1970);
Sheridan, Juveniles Wbo Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional
System?, FED. PRORATION, March 1967, at 26. Both of these articles are excerpted
in Fox at 254-59, 259-64. See also N. MoRius & G. HA-wINs, Tim HoaNsr PoLrncIAN's
GUIDE TO CRIAM CONTROL 146-47 (1970); PREsIDENT'S ComrIssIoN ON LAw ENFoaaRcmEr
Am) ADmNisTRATIoN OF JuSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AN
Youn Caurm 22-23 (1967); Fitch, The Need for Revision of Virginia's Juvenile Court
Statute, Tam COLONIAL LAWYER, Winter 1973, at 4 (published by the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, The College of William and Mary); Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Pro-
cedural Process and Substantive Status, 1970 Wisc. L. Rev. 352; Comment, Juvenile De-
linquency Laws: Juvenile Women and the Double Standard of Morality, 19 U.CL.A.L.
Rav. 313 (1971).
95. 65 Misc. 2d 708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1971).
96. 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. 1969).
97. VA. CODE ANN.. §§ 16.1-158(f), (g), (h), (j) (Repl. Vol. 1960). Similar pro-
visions have been held unconstitutionally vague in Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424
(N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), appeal filed, 42 U.SL.W. 3016 (U.S. Apr. 9, 1971) (No.
70-120); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S.
913 (1972) (statute authorizing incarceration in adult facilities of juveniles adjudicated
"willfully disobedient" or "morally depraved"); In re E.M.B., 13 CRur.. L. R.P. 2328
(D.C. Super. Ct., June 14, 1973) (No. J. 1365-73). Contra, United States v. Myers, 143
F. Supp. I (D. Ala. 1956); In re Daniel R, 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1969); State v. Mattiella, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (1966), appeal dismissed for
'want of a properly presented federal question, 395 U.S. 209 (1969); S.S. v. State, 299
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Although the conclusion that status offenses should be removed from
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is almost inescapable,9" at least on
conceptual grounds, it is more difficult to say what, if anything, society
should do to meet the needs of at least some portion of this group of
children who are frequently seriously troubled and desperate for help.
The prohibition of the incarceration of such children, preferably by
statutory mandate instead of judicial fiat,99 would at least alleviate some
of the most flagrant and troubling abuses. "Diversion programs," such
as those operated in Sacramento, California, and recently implemented in
Virginia Beach and Norfolk, Virginia, emphasizing short- or medium-
term family counseling, hold great potential in terms of effectiveness
and cost-benefit, at least in theory, and seem to be demonstrating their
utility in those jurisdictions where they are properly staffed and ad-
ministered.' 0 A more comprehensive variant of the family counseling-
oriented diversion units are the Youth Service Bureaus advocated and
sometimes funded by the Office of Youth Development of the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.' 10 Unfortunately,
the prospects for such alternatives to overly broad juvenile court juris-
diction are not, if one is to be realistic, very bright, due to their inability
to offer the parent jurisdictions immediate, short-term cost savings or
even tradeoffs (although long-term savings are quite likely) and the
reluctance of many juvenile court judges and other personnel to forsake
their "responsibility," that is, their broad power over the entire range
of juvenile affairs.
Fox's materials on police handling of juveniles are equally compre-
hensive. The various constitutional issues-arrest, search and seizure,
interrogations, lineups, fingerprinting, and official records-are, nearly
without exception, covered through well-selected cases, other materials,
A.2d 560 (Me. 1973); State v. L.N, 109 NJ. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150, aff'd mer.,
57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970). See also Gonion, Section 601 California Welfare
and Institutions Code: A Need for a Change, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 294 (1972); Note,
Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the juvenile Court, 82 YALE LJ. 745 (1973).
98. See articles cited note 94 supra.
99. See, e.g., In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973)
(holding that a child found to be in need of supervision may not be committed to a
state training school housing children involved in criminal conduct); cf. Martarella v.
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), order entered, 359 F. Supp. 478 (1973).
100. MASTER PLAN, supra note 19, at 173-74.
101. See, e.g., OFFICE OF YoUTH DEVELOPMIENT, U.S. DEt"r OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELPARE, CHALLENE, AcnoN, CANcE: A CoMmuNITY GrIm FOR YOUTH DEVELOP-




and questions which lend themselves to extensive discussion and analysis.
The nonlegal materials in this chapter, especially those primarily from
the social sciences in the section entitled "The Police and the 'System,' "
are even more stimulating. They demonstrate to the reader that many,
if not most, incidents which could be formally adjudicated in the
juvenile court as alleged delinquencies are, instead, informally disposed
of by the police in one way or another. As can a court, the police may
do nothing, warn and release a child, place him on "probation," punish
him, try to help him, or utilize any combination of these possibilities. The
materials make clear that if one is really interested in "reducing" delin-
quency or "dealing with it" differently, attention must be afforded the
hitherto largely unstructured, uncontrolled, and even unknown "juvenile
justice system" within the police departments of our cities. The issues
of the extent to which and how this "low visibility" -12 system is to be
modified or otherwise reformed reflect the larger question of whether
and how the unbridled discretion now exercised by the police in nearly
every aspect of their operation is to be structured and controlled.
Whether to patrol a neighborhood with one car or two, or on foot, or
not at all; whether and how to respond to reported or observed offenses;
under what circumstances to use varying degrees of force, including
deadly force; whether to arrest a suspect or not-these and numerous
other resource allocation, planning, tactical, and enforcement decisions
by every member of the department, from the chief to the most inex-
perienced recruit, are constantly made in every city without the knowl-
edge of or input from the citizenry. They are, moreover, largely un-
affected by judicial decisions.1 3
The various problems in structuring, channeling, and controlling
police decisionmaking regarding these and other issues presently are
receiving substantial attention.10 Any movement toward surfacing and
102. Cf. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Lou-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
103. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases,
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 785, 785-93 (1970).
104. K. DAvis, DiscR -noNARY Jusncn (2d ed. 1971) is the seminal work in this area.
The author observes:
The police are among the most important policy-makling agencies, despite
the widespread assumption that they are not ....
The system is atrociously unsound under which an individual policeman
has unguided discretionary power to weigh social values in an individual
case and make a final decision as to governmental policy for that case,
despite a statute to the contrary, without review by any other authority,
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systematizing the exercise of discretion by youth bureau members and
other police officers in their handling of juveniles, the area in which the
police as well as the courts traditionally have exercised their greatest
discretion, should have substantial impact on the broader issues just
mentioned.
The juvenile system's perennial problem with the alleged delinquent's
prehearing status, that is, whether he should be incarcerated pending
adjudication of his case, is treated almost as comprehensively by Fox.
The book has ample materials for discussion of and reference on such
continuously pressing issues as whether children have or should have a
right to bail, the proper criteria for deciding whether a child should be
detained prior to adjudication, the related question of the reasons for
and solutions to overcrowding of detention facilities and the conse-
quent placement of children in adult jails, the constitutional question of
the type of hearing, if any, which must be conducted concerning the
child's initial and continued placement in detention, and the matter
of the living conditions and rehabilitation-oriented treatment services to
which a child may be entitled constitutionally or statutorily. The chap-
without recording the facts he finds, without stating reasons and without
relating one case to another.
ld. at 81, 88 (emphasis omitted). See also Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law
Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAw & CoNTEMp. PRoB. 500 (1971); Caplan, Introduction to
Model Rules for Law Enforcement: Release of Arrest and Conviction Records, 9
CRiM. L. BuLL. 407 (1973). Caplan is the former director of the Arizona State Uni-
versity Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking. Other work products
of the Project include Eyewitness Identification (Dec. 1972); Searches, Seizures, and
Inventories of Motor Vehicles (Jan. 1973), reprinted in 10 CRIer. L. BuLL. 15 (1974);
Warrantless Searches of Persons and Places (March 1973), reprinted in 9 Cum. L.
BuLL. 645 (1973); Stop and Frisk (June 1973); and Search Warrant Execution (Dec.
1973). See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRojEct ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JvsncF, STANDARDS RFLATING TO TRE URBAN PoLicE FurcnoN (1973); W. LAFAV,
ARREST: TBE DECISION TO Tha A STJsPFr INTO CUSTODY (1965); NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER, REPORT (1968); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 21-25 (1973); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSiON
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATiON OF JusTicE, Tan CALENGE OF CRIM
IN A FREE SocIETY 103 (1967); Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27
U. Cm. L. REv. 427 (1960); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for
Improving Police Performance, 65 Micr. L. REv. 1123 (1967); Kadish, Legal Norms
and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962);
LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pts. 1-2), 1962 Wisc. L. REv.
104, 179; McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MIc-. L. REv. 659 (1972); Note,
Contemporary Studies Project: Administrative Control of Police Discretion, 58 IowA
L. REv. 894 (1973); Note, Procedural Due Process in the Context of Informal Admin-
istrative Action: The Requirements for Notice, Hearing and Prospective Standards
Relating to Police Selective Enforcement Practice, 53 B.U.L. REv. 1038 (1973).
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ter's only deficiency is its lack of any materials on the issue of the
judicial remedies available for children who are mistreated while in de-
tention or subjected to unconstitutional or otherwise unacceptable con-
ditions; this weakness is due partly, but not entirely, to the book's pub-
lication in mid-1972.10
Such an oversight might have been a substantial one in light of the
explosive developments in "prison law" or "prisoners' rights" resulting
from the flurry of litigation, primarily in the federal courts, over first,
fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendment issues in the prison
context. 06 It is remedied partially by the inclusion in the chapter on
"Juvenile Corrections" of materials dealing with related problems. In
the "Reform Schools" section of that chapter, the issues of the minimal
conditions to which even incarcerated children are constitutionally en-
titled and the constitutional limitations on the punishment to which
such juveniles may be subjected are presented quite adequately through
the important case of Lollis v. New York State Department of Social
Services.1 7 As a whole, however, this section misses the thrust of the
prisoner rights issue, even though a number of fundamentally important
cases had been decided prior to the publication of the book."0 " Even
in 1971 and early 1972, such cases were clearly harbingers of similar
105. See, e.g., Juvenile Detention Center, Baltimore City Jail (Sup. Bench of Baltimore
City, Md., Aug. 3, 1971 & Nov. 10, 1971) (memorandum opinion), in which the court
found that the conditions under which children were being detained pending adjudica-
tion constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments and, relying on its powers as a court of equity, ordered not only that
numerous changes be made in operating procedures and physical conditions, regardless
of the expense involved, but also that the detention facility cease to be used to house
juveniles at all within a year of the court's order. See also In re Savoy, Nos. 70-4808
and 70-4714 (Juv. Ct. of D.C., Oct. 13, 1970), in which the chief judge of. the court
entered an order with similarly sweeping provisions. Subsequent newspaper headlines
reflect both the necessity and the difficulties of continued court monitoring of such
cases: "Receiving Home Ordered Closed; Judge Scathes D. C. for Inaction," The
'Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1973, § A, at 1; "D. C. Fails to Find New Shelters as
Ordered," id., Feb. 18, 1973, § C, at 2; "Juvenile Shelters Unready," id., Oct. 20, 1973,
S B, at 1; "30 Juveniles Waiting Trial Freed," id., Feb. 28, 1974, § B, at 3.
106. H. FRiENDLY, FEnmuL JURIsDIcTION: A GENERAL Vmw 16 (1973).
107. 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
108. E.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Morris v.
Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776 (D.R.I. 1970); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). Fox, in fact, refers to one aspect of Sostre (Fox at
851-52) but neglects the many other aspects of this important case.
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challenges to fundamental aspects of day-to-day operations and pro-
cedures in juvenile institutions.1' 9
At a somewhat different, more operational level, the book also fails
to present an adequate picture of what might be considered the initial
phase of the correctional process-the juvenile court's disposition deci-
sion. Fox is to be commended for providing the only widespread dis-
semination of a study by the Committee on Mental Health Services
Inside and Outside the Family Court in the City of New York, en-
titled "Juvenile Justice Confounded; Pretensions and Realities of Treat-
ment Services." 110 This extremely important study devastatingly doc-
uments the rampant discrimination by private and voluntary agencies
against older children, children involved in serious or drug-related of-
fenses, and children from minority groups, a situation which is by no
means confined to New York City. Other than this selection, the book
does not really capture or convey to the reader the difficult, crucial
decisionmaking process which juvenile court judges and lawyers must
undertake daily in the face of the unforgivably limited resources for and
knowledge about effective correctional intervention strategies.
The chapter on the depressing topic of juvenile corrections ends the
109. Those germinal cases have since borne fruit in the juvenile system: Inmates of
the Boy's Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Nelson v. Heyne,
355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972, supp. opinion 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.
1974). In each case, the courts held that various living conditions, disciplinary sanctions,
and administrative procedures involving the use of tranquilizing drugs and mail censor-
ship violated the constitutional rights of the juvenile inmates. The courts also held that
incarcerated juveniles are statutorily (346 F. Supp. at 1364; 355 F. Supp. at 459) or con-
stitutionally (355 F. Supp. at 459; 491 F.2d at 358-60) entitled to rehabilitative efforts on
the part of the state. The court in Affteck further held that purported budget limitations
do not provide a valid excuse for failing to remedy unconstitutional conditions and
practices. 346 F. Supp. at 1374. In an "interim emergency order" in Morales v. Turman,
364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), the court prescribed disciplinary procedures, limited
solitary confinement, prohibited mail censorship, appointed an institutional ombudsman,
required the psychological screening of prospective employees, and held that incarcerated
juveniles have a constitutional right to treatment. It would appear, unfortunately, that
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (ED. Va. 1971), establishes a precedent for sim-
ilar adjudication regarding juvenile institutions in Virginia, if recent newspaper reports
are accurate: Brown, "Children Committed by State Merely Confined, Not Helped,"
Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 27, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 3; Brown, "Children's Rights
Long Ignored," id., May 28, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 1; "Custodial Care is Inbred," id., May
29, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 3; Brown, "Concentrated Efforts Needed to Solve Problems in
Youth Institutions," id., § A, at 1, col. 5.
110. The study committee was chaired by Judge Poller (see text accompanying
notes 14-21 supra). The study was published in 1972 by the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Hackensack, N.J.
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book with a section entitled "Innovations," which competently surveys
modern ideas and treatment approaches in juvenile corrections. The
primary emphasis on halfway houses and basic clinical evaluation tech-
niques 1' reflects all too accurately our almost total ignorance of the
actual effects any given sanction has on children." 2 The minutes from
a recent symposium on youth services bureaus with which Fox ends his
casebook reflect accurately the real issues facing us at the present time:
One general theme which was touched upon was the diffi-
culty of producing real change in a complex, interlocking system
such as criminal justice, a system which has an unlimited capacity
to absorb and neutralize innovation.
[Another] speaker raised the possibility that "diversion for
diversion's sake" might be valuable. Perhaps some children are
better off the less we do for them, and therefore it might be well
to set up a social institution which will enable the community to
do less for some children. The key problem here is, of course,
the diagnostic one. How do we identify the children for whom
minimal intervention is desirable?
The speaker's final point was that talk of diversion can mask
assumptions. We must ask whether youth services bureaus will
inevitably deal with children who would have been fed into the
criminal justice system, or whether one result of the creation of
these agencies might be the imposition of controls on children
upon whom such controls might not othervise have been im-
posed.113
This, of course, is simply another way of saying, along with Judge
Poller, that "those concerned with the rights [or, it might have been
added, the treatment or rehabilitation] of children are imprisoned
111. It has been observed that "[tihere has been too heavy a reliance upon the
classical, clinical, psychiatric, and medical model for diagnosing juveniles, youthful
offenders, and adults in trouble with the law in the Commonwealth of Virginia."
MASTER PLAxa, supra note 19, at 11.
112. Legislatures are notoriously hesitant to allocate funds for the kind of, valid cor-
rectional research which, in the long run, would avoid the waste of millions of dollars.
Cf. MAsrE PLM,, supra note 19, at 17: "Currently no funds are available within the
Division of Youth Services or the Division of Corrections for research and evaluation
purposes. Ordinarily, between 2-10 percent of an operating budget is necessary for
a viable research and evaluation unit."
113. Seymour, The Current Status of Youth Service Bureaus: A Report on a Youth
Service Bureau Seminar, in Fox at 895, 897, 896.
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within a system which denies access to the very goals they seek." 114
That this need not always be so is demonstrated by the Goldstein-
Freud-Solnit book. Such hopelessness is also beginning to dissipate in
at least one other important area of children's rights which Wilkerson,
inexplicably, intentionally omits from his volume-the rights of children
(and adults as well) to truly effective treatment and basically humane
conditions in institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded,
and the closely related issue of the rights of retarded, autistic, learning-
disabled, hyperkinetic, and other exceptional children to a public edu-
cation which meets their needs or at least meets their needs as equally
as it meets the needs of supposedly more "normal" children." 5 This
aspect of the law pertaining to children, which saw important develop-
ments before the publication of Wilkerson's book1 6 and today is one
of the most fertile and hopeful in the entire civil rights field," 7 alerts us
once again, through its inevitable exposure of abuses, to the hypocracies
of supposedly benevolent intentions which lead to the excessive use of
almost inherently debilitating institutionalization. Similarly, this new
area of the law underscores the lesson, implicit in all three of the re-
viewed volumes, that, given our limited knowledge about treatment and
other helping services, the most economical, least harmful, and often
most effective way of dealing with troubled children is to work with
most of them in the traditional settings-the home, the community, the
public school-which are taken for granted by those of us fortunate
enough and powerful enough to continue to be labeled "normal."
114. Text accompanying note 17 supra.
115. Judge Forer at least identifies these issues in a brief but prescient section of
her article, supra note 32.
116. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 373 (MD. Ala. 1972), 344
F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed sub nor. Wyatt v. Aderholt, No.
72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972; Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972). On the related issue of the suspension or expulsion of children from school,
see, for example, Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967). See also
Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NoaM DAMe
LAw. 133 (1971); Symposium, The Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRAcusm
L. Rv. 991 (1972).
117. Comprehensive review and analysis of recent developments may be found in
Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and
Proposals, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 40 (1974); Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen
and Institutional Labor, 87 HAxv. L. REv. 567 (1974).
